The constitutionality of the national popular vote: refuting challenges based on Article II, Section One
June 26, 2012
by Rob Richie and Elise Helgesen of FairVote
The National Popular Vote (NPV) plan guarantees election of the presidential candidate who earns the greatest number of votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. NPV does not dispense with the Electoral College, and is not a constitutional amendment. Rather, the plan is based on two clear powers given to the states under the Constitution: the power under Article 2 Section 1 to choose how to allocate its presidential electors, and the power under Article 1 Section 10 to enter into interstate compacts.
States in early U.S. history often exercised the power to change rules for allocating electoral votes. While today, 48 states and the District of Columbia award their electoral votes to the winner of that state’s popular vote, the founders did not originally contemplate this type of system, as James Madison explained in 1823.
NPV is an interstate compact, a binding contract entered into by state law. Once the states that enact these NPV laws exceed the threshold of a majority of electoral votes (270 out of 538), the plan will take effect. Even where states choose not to participate in the NPV compact, the votes from those states will be incorporated on an equal basis into the total national popular vote, which in turn determine which candidate earns the electoral votes in NPV states.
Currently eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws to join the NPV interstate compact. The states are California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Washington, and Vermont. The NPV plan is now at its halfway point, meaning that states that have entered into the interstate compact make up 132 electoral votes, or 49% of the 270 electoral votes needed.
Even with this milestone in sight and polls consistently showing strong support in states across the U.S., the NPV plan faces individual opposition as well as specific legal challenges to its effectiveness. The concerns are answered effectively by the authors of Every Vote Equal, and supportive groups like National Popular Vote, Support Popular Vote, and FairVote.
This analysis addresses one particular challenge raised recently by NPV opponents such as Sean Parnell: that NPV is unconstitutional as based on Article II Section 1 of the Constitution. The second clause of this section states: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .” (more…)
New Mexico Supreme Court candidate disqualified
May 16, 2012
New Mexico Supreme Court Says Judicial Candidate was Properly Disqualified from Election and Fined for Violations of Public Campaign Financing Law
On April 12, 2012, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that candidate for a seat on the New Mexico Court of Appeals was properly disqualified from the election and fined. The case, Montoya v. Herrera concerned Dennis Montoya’s 2010 bid for a seat on the state appeals court. Judge Linda Vanzi was running to confirm the seat to which the governor had appointed her three years earlier and continue her job with the approval of voters. Montoya ran against her, and applied for public funding under the New Mexico Voter Action Act.
Then-secretary of state, Mary Herrera, “informed Appellant by letter that he was not qualified to receive public funding because he had violated the Act’s contribution limits and reporting requirements.” After a hearing, the action was upheld because Montoya was found to have exceeded the seed money limits of the New Mexico Voter Action Act and failed to comply with the secretary’s reporting requirements. Herrera imposed a $2,000 fine on Montoya for his violations.
Montoya appealed the disqualification and fine, which went straight to the highest court because he was running for a seat on the intermediate appellate court. The state supreme court considered whether he had violated the seed money regulations of the act, which impose a $5,000 limit on a candidate’s contributions to his own campaign. Montoya contributed over $8,000 to his own campaign, but argued they were for general expenses rather than seed money. The state high court rejected that argument, saying there is no such distinction in the wording of the law.
The New Mexico Supreme Court explained that, “when [Montoya] contributed more than $8,000 of his own money to the campaign, while simultaneously applying for public funds, he violated the Act. Under the law, the Secretary had no choice but to disqualify him from public financing, and she did so.” It also dismissed Montoya’s First-Amendment claim because he choose to apply for public financing, when self-financing campaigns is allowed. This is a somewhat surprising outcome, as First Amendment claims have done well elsewhere.
The court upheld the fine as well, because the secretary of state was required by law to impose a civil penalty on anyone who violates the Act, regardless of his or her intent or knowledge of the violation.
New Mexico Supreme Court opinion
KOB local news
Election plans fail
May 14, 2012
At least one plan for selecting judges in Tennessee is now totally off the table. For my previous posts on the debate in the Tennessee General Assembly see here and here. Last week, the House Judiciary Committee voted 7-7 on Representative Glen Casada’s (R-Franklin) plan to elect judges and justices in contested elections. As a result of the tie vote, one vote shy of the majority needed to advance the bill, legislators now have only two proposals in front of them.
Casada was clearly displeased with the rejection of his proposal: “I’m disappointed to say the least.” He went on to contend that “[t]he constitution governs how we do business and do public policy in the state. To be out of compliance is wrong. If you can’t comply with the most basic, how can you trust us to comply with other parts of the law as well?” Executive Director of the Tennessee Bar Association Allan Ramsaur was not convinced: “Let’s get away from this myth that what we have is not an elected system. We do elect judges, we just don’t have contests which lead to partisanship and big money influence.”
Now, Tennessee legislators are considering the two remaining plans in the rush before the legislative session ends at the end of April. Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey (R-Blountville) hopes that legislators will approve both plans and then come back in the next session to make a final decision. The first proposal amends the state constitution to explicitly provide for the current system—the so-called Tennessee Plan. The second proposal would mirror the federal judicial selection system (nomination by the executive with confirmation from the upper house of the legislature).
Legislators have to make a decision before the end of this legislative session. Should the Tennessee Senate approve both plans, then the new General Assembly, which will convene in January 2013, could pick up the stalemate. If the General Assembly fails to make any decision, then the debate will rage on into the next session.
For further coverage see the Knoxville News Sentinel and the Missouri News Horizon.
Timothy Huffstutter is a third-year student at William and Mary Law.
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Election Law Society Weblog on Break for Finals
April 20, 2012
The editors of William & Mary’s Election Law Society Weblog will be on hiatus for the examination period.
We will resume posting May 14, 2012.
Thank you! (more…)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Validates Iowa Judicial Nominating Commission’s Makeup
April 18, 2012
by Nick Mueller
On April 9, 2012 the Eighth Circuit dismissed a case brought by four Iowa voters challenging the constitutionality of the process for the selection of members of the State Judicial Nominating Commission, the commission that selects candidates for the Governor to nominate to the Iowa Supreme Court. The issue in contention was that seven of the commission’s 15 members are required to be Iowa attorneys and that these attorneys are voted on not by the general public but by members of the Iowa bar. The voters bringing the suit claimed that allowing only attorneys to vote, as opposed to the general public, violates the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.
In deciding this case the court made a number of important legal findings. It found that the commission served a “special and limited purpose” as opposed to performing “general governmental functions” such as taxing or issuing bonds. It also found that, while the decisions of these members will affect all Iowans, they particularly affect attorneys in unique and amplified ways. Having made these two findings they deem this election a “special interest election,” and under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, participation in such elections are reviewed with a lower level of scrutiny. Instead of invoking the familiar “one person, one vote” standard, they ruled that as long as the selection process for commission members had a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest, then the process was constitutional. (more…)
When judges take money: Campaign contributions in judicial elections
April 16, 2012
On March 29, 2012, the William & Mary Election Law Society and Election Law Program held a symposium entitled, “More Money, More Problems: Money in Judicial Elections” in Williamsburg, Virginia. The afternoon symposium featured two panels of distinguished speakers moderated by SCOTUSblog reporter Lyle Denniston.
The first panel focused on the financial issues surrounding judicial elections, specifically whether campaign contributions work differently in judicial elections than in legislative elections and if campaign donations result in some form of civic harm even when they do not reach the level of outright bribery. The panelists included: James Bopp, election mega-lawyer and litigator of Citizens United; Justice Thomas R. Phillips, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas; and former Federal Elections Commission Chairman Bradley Smith, who currently serves as Josiah H. Blackmore/Shirley M. Nault Professor of Law at Capital University Law School and Chairman of the Center for Competitive Politics, an organization he founded. (more…)
Alabama sidesteps VRA § 5 preclearance status quo: I’ll see you in court
April 13, 2012
by John Alford
As part of the mandated decennial redistricting, the Alabama legislature will change the lines for the State’s congressional and school board districts. Current and proposed maps can be found here. This redistricting will alter the political landscape of the State, but before Alabama can move forward on redistricting, the Federal Government has to approve of the new map as per the Voting Rights Act § 5 (“VRA”). Under the VRA § 5, there are two paths Alabama can take to get preclearance. It can seek approval through the Justice Department (DOJ) or through the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. (For more on the VRA § 5, particularly why and how states like Alabama get preclearance from the Federal Government, see here.) Alabama has opted to take the matter to court.
Like many other covered jurisdictions, Alabama is unhappy with the requirement that the Justice Department (DOJ) keep tabs on its election process. To wit, Shelby County recently filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the preclearance process, so far unsuccessfully (see more about this lawsuit here.) The opinion in Shelby County emanates from the same court from which Alabama is seeking preclearance on redistricting. But the ruling against Shelby County should not alter how the District Court views the issue here. Overturning VRA § 5 would be an extreme political move, essentially declaring that issues of race no longer disrupt the electoral process in states historically notorious for prejudicial practices. Granting preclearance to a redistricting plan, as routinely done in the past, is nowhere near as high a hurdle for Alabama to clear. (more…)
Montana to vote on Supreme Court justice elections
April 11, 2012
On April 18, 2011, the Montana state legislature passed SB 268 which calls for a referendum vote to determine the future of elections for the Montana Supreme Court. On June 5, 2012, on the 2012 Primary Election Ballot, voters in Montana will determine whether Montana will begin to elect Supreme Court justices by districts.
Although the Montana state senate passed SB 268 the Attorney General’s office and Secretary of State are statutorily obligated to approve of the language of the Statement of Purpose designed to explain the purpose of the referendum. Andrew Huff, Assistant Attorney General of the state of Montana, passed along a copy of the accepted language. The Statement of Purpose reads:
The Montana Supreme Court is composed of seven justices, one of whom is Chief Justice. Under current law, the justices are elected statewide and each Montanan votes for all seven positions. LR-119 would change existing law so that each justice is elected from one of seven districts of approximately equal population, with the Chief Justice then chosen from the seven by majority vote of the justices. Only Montanans living in each district would vote for their district’s justice. Justices must reside in their district when initially elected. (more…)
A series of tubes: Transmitting ballots via the Internet
April 9, 2012
The Internet is a strange and unpredictable place, filled with cats playing keyboard and Rick Astley videos. It’s the kind of place you wouldn’t want your ballot floating around without protection. So, ever since the widespread adoption of electronic voting machines, voters and election administrators alike have feared for the safety of votes traveling through the Internet tubes.
Five voters in Hawaii, concerned about the accuracy and safety of electronically transmitted ballots, filed suit against Chief Election Officer Kevin Cronin to prevent the use of electronic voting machines in the 2010 elections. The suit, Babson v. Cronin, resulted from the Hawaii Office of Election’s decision to use Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines in the 2010 elections. DRE voting machines eliminate the need for paper ballots by storing the vote electronically. In some DRE machines, the vote is stored on a physical device, like a flash drive, and then physically taken to a central vote tabulation machine. In other DRE machines, like those used in Hawaii, the vote is transmitted electronically through an Internet style network. (more…)
One party state: The closing of Idaho’s Republican primary
April 5, 2012
Recently, Idaho Democrats reaffirmed their commitment to an open primary, which allows any elector to choose that party’s ballot (and only that party’s ballot) in the primary election. Any voter in Idaho may choose to participate in the Democratic Party’s primary. This means that Democrats and unaffiliateds may vote in the primary, because a Republican choosing to vote in the Democratic primary would forego their right to participate in the Republican primary under Idaho law. The Democratic Party’s commitment to an open primary is significant, because it means that Idaho has both a closed and an open primary.
The transition to this semi-open primary system has been rocky in the Gem State. It began in 2008 with a coup in the Idaho Republican Party. A plank was included in the platform that called for primaries to be closed. A closed primary, however, would require changes to Idaho law, which up until this summer had no provision for recording partisan registration. In order to force the state to make this change, the Idaho Republican Party sued the Republican Secretary of State, arguing that Idaho’s open primary laws violated the Constitution in an as-applied challenge.
In March of 2011 U.S. District Judge B. Lynn Winmill concluded that the Idaho open primary law violated the First Amendment right of association that the Idaho Republican Party enjoyed. Judge Winmill relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones, which held that blanket primaries, where individuals could vote in any primary election across party lines, were an unconstitutional infringement on the associational rights of political parties. The Court reasoned that a political party would be unable to effectively convey its message if that message was in part controlled by individuals not affiliated with the party.
What is remarkable about Judge Winmill’s decision is how low the standard is for a plaintiff to show that their associational rights are being infringed. Judge Winmill relied on expert testimony to show that there was a roughly ten percent rate of crossover voting in Republican primaries. Judge Winmill acknowledged that these rates were lower than faced by the Court in Jones, but held that even lower rates of crossover voting would trigger grave Constitutional concerns. It is difficult to imagine, given Judge Winmill’s reasoning, any instance where a state could show that an open primary law could be considered constitutional in the face of a political party’s resistance to opening its nominating procedure. The Fourth Circuit seemed to agree with Judge Winmill when, in 2007, it struck down a similar open primary law in Virginia.
While the defendants in the Idaho case did not advance much in the way of a state interest that would provide a compelling justification for its open primary law, one of the interests advanced in Virginia has particular relevance for Idaho. The Fourth Circuit rejected an argument by the state that its open primary law was justified on the grounds that, in many instances, the primary was tantamount to the general election. The experts that Judge Winmill relied upon concluded that Idaho is the most single party state in the country, and that “voters do likely cross over; they have to in order to have any meaningful influence in elections and express their sincere preferences with regard to their own representation.”
In response to this decision, Idaho recently changed its primary election laws. The new law, which will govern this year’s elections, requires an elector wishing to vote in a partisan primary be registered with that party. Beginning this year, electors will register as members of a party. If an affiliated elector wishes to change affiliation, they must notify the Secretary of State by the last day that a candidate must file to run for the election. Unaffiliated voters may change affiliation on election day, though this is a commitment that will carry over to the next election. The law therefore makes it easy for unaffiliated voters to become affiliated, but makes it difficult for affiliated voters to switch their affiliation. The law builds in protections for affiliated voters who choose to vote in the Democratic primary, which allows unaffiliated voters to participate. If the unaffiliated elector chooses a partisan ballot when the party allows unaffiliateds to vote, then while the choice is noted they are not considered to be registered as a member of that party and may still quickly change their affiliation.
In a state like Idaho, a semi-open primary creates concerns. In no other state in the Union is a primary so closely tied to the general election. However, the Supreme Court, in the Jones and Tashjian cases, appears to have stripped states of the power to adjust primary processes to conditions within the state. It may be that Democratic complaints about growing radicalism among the Idaho GOP is just sour grapes, they have the misfortune of living in a state where the majority of people have rejected their party platform. But the fact remains that the only moderating influence on the Idaho GOP is the primary, because the Republican Party is assured dominance in the general. Judge Winmill, perhaps rightly, rejected the idea that growing radicalism could be a state interest that contravened the First Amendment. After all, it is the right of the Republican Party to be as radical as it wants, just as it is the right of voters to reject that Party if it is too radical for their tastes.
Nathan Pittman is a third-year student at William and Mary Law.