Non-Citizens United: Free Speech, Political Contributions, and Lawful Permanent Residents in Ohio
May 3, 2026
The Statute
Federal law prohibits certain foreign entities from making political contributions to candidate campaigns. 52 U.S.C. 30121(b)(2). States often seek to expand this federal prohibition, adding prohibitions on political contributions to issue advocacy groups or ballot measure campaigns. However, many of these state-level foreign influence bans use slightly different statutory language than the federal ban—occasionally causing problems for noncitizen residents who wish to make their voice heard.
In 2023, Ohio passed a foreign influence ban, which was largely similar to the federal law, but included lawful permanent residents (LPRs, also known as green card holders) in the list of entities prohibited from making political contributions. Compare Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.121(A)(2)(a) with 52 U.S.C. 30121(b)(2). This ban on political participation by LPRs directly prohibits their exercise of free speech rights.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated, LPRs are protected by the First Amendment. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–97 (1953) (reiterating that once lawfully admitted, noncitizens are entitled to constitutional protections). Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United, financial support of political candidates is a form of speech, and thus protected by the First Amendment. Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). As the court has repeatedly recognized, political speech is a particularly essential element of the protections conveyed by the First Amendment. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Com’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (Stating that political advocacy is “the essence of First Amendment expression”). While democratic principles support a limit to this right for foreign nationals, the Supreme Court has recognized that the high level of commitment to and integration with American society grants LPRs special protections over other foreign nationals. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (stating that protections for immigrants are “accorded [on] a generous and ascending scale of protection as he increases his identity with our society”).
It would be reasonable to conclude, based on these cases, that such core elements of the Constitutional right to political expression extend to LPRs (of whom there are roughly 13 million today). See Sarah Miller, Office of Homeland Security Statistics, Estimates of the Lawful Permanent Resident Population in the United States and the Subpopulation Eligible to Naturalize: 2024 and Revised 2023 (Sept. 2024). However, litigation over Ohio’s foreign influence ban upheld a statute that prohibited these contributions—suggesting that the role of free speech in the democratic process may be shifting in the eyes of the courts. See OPAWL v. Yost, 118 F.4th 770 (6th Cir. 2024).
The Injunction
In 2024, OPAWL (formerly known as Ohio Progressive Asian Women’s Leadership) sued to enjoin Ohio’s law, alleging that the Ohio law amounted to a violation of the First Amendment as applied to LPRs. OPAWL v. Yost, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1065 (S.D. Ohio, 2024). The District Court granted OPAWL an injunction after reviewing Ohio’s law under strict scrutiny and ruling that the state’s interest (preventing foreign influence in elections) was sufficiently compelling, but the law failed the tailoring requirements of strict scrutiny. Id. at 1084. The ruling was predicated on three findings:
First, the law’s focus on political contributions by lawful permanent residents was causally unrelated to foreign influence concerns. Id. at 1086. While broadly recognizing the causal connection between noncitizen political activity and foreign election influence, the court treated LPRs as a distinct class of noncitizen with better-protected rights. Id. Essentially, green card holders are less foreign, and don’t present the same risk of facilitating foreign influence on those grounds. Id. at 1088 (citing Bluman v. Federal Election Com’n, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 290-91 (D. D.C. 2011)). Because there wasn’t adequate evidence that the state had to burden LPRs’ speech in order to prevent foreign influence, the district court granted OPAWL’s injunction. Id. at 1086-88.
Second, the court found the law to be overinclusive because it prevented some U.S. citizens from contributing from finances that were shared with noncitizen spouses. Id. at 1088-89. Because the sweep of the law limited contributions by U.S. citizens from marital accounts shared with noncitizens, the court found that the law was overinclusive, and failed the tailoring test. Id. Finally, the district court found that the law was underinclusive because it failed to address the threats of foreign interference posed by U.S.-based, foreign-owned corporate entities. Id. at 1089. Having failed to show adequate causation or sufficiently narrow tailoring, the District Court granted the injunction. See Id. at 1092. Yost, the Attorney General for the state, appealed.
The Appeal
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. See OPAWL v. Yost, 118 F.4th 770 (6th Cir. 2024). The majority opinion took issue with several aspects of the District Court’s analysis. First, they ruled that historical concerns about foreign interference, combined with recent political trends, had satisfied Ohio’s burden of proof with regards to the ban on political activity by lawful permanent residents. Id. at 780 (citing George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796) (discussing the long history of concern over foreign interference in elections)).
More interesting was the Sixth Circuit’s argument that law’s inclusion of LPRs was permissible even though it restricted seemingly innocuous speech by LPRs. The Sixth Circuit responded to OPAWL’s arguments that even harmless speech was prohibited by saying that the law “plugs a loophole by which a non-citizen could, say, buy a yard-sign for $20,000 and circumvent Ohio’s other spending prohibitions.” Id. at 783. Further, the court found that even if there hadn’t been legitimate cause for concern with regards to LPRs, there weren’t enough of them for the infringements of their rights to matter. Id. at 775-76. To reach this conclusion, the court measured the LPR population against the total global population of noncitizens, finding that “only about 0.14% of the people covered by the law” would be LPRs. Id. at 776. Because the LPRs made up a small proportion of the total group affected by the law, an injunction wouldn’t be justified – even if there weren’t legitimate cause to include LPRs. See Id.
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that, while the inclusion of LPRs may have been overinclusive, and the failure to include foreign-owned U.S. corporations may have been underinclusive, the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups amounted to policy decisions by a legislature. Id. at 784 In the eyes of the Sixth Circuit, protecting the rights of LPRs would be tantamount to a “demand that the government sacrifice its compelling interest.” Id. at 784. Ohio was “free to strike its own balance” between achieving its interest and honoring the rights of its populace—even if it came at the cost of LPR’s First Amendment rights. Id.
The Implications
In an election law context, the First Amendment takes on special importance—and is often subject to special rules. PACs are commonly compelled to disclose their identities and funding, often in specific, highly-regulated formats. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 84501 et seq. However, complete bans on political speech are uncommon, and applying them to groups who have a constitutional right to free speech, even rarer. As more states adopt similar expansions of the federal ban, it’s likely that similar issues will arise.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision here seems to have found a new balance between constitutional protections for free speech and the necessity of securing the democratic process against overseas interference. Whether other circuits will be persuaded by discussion of $20,000 yard signs is yet to be seen; the outcome in OPAWL v. Yost underscores the growing judicial willingness to privilege election integrity over individual speech, potentially redrawing the lines of the First Amendment in the process.