Maryland’s VRA and the Uncertain Future of State Responses to Callais
September 30, 2026
By Peter Favret
Earlier this year, in April, Maryland became one of three states to pass a new state-wide Voting Rights Act in 2026. Delaware and New Jersey also passed state voting rights acts this year. The action takes place against a backdrop of a little over a decade of Supreme Court decisions that decreased the breadth and power of the original 1965 act. Provisions that were scaled back include the preclearance provision (Section Five), which required certain “covered jurisdictions” with a history of racial discrimination to obtain advance approval from the federal government before making changes to voting procedures, and Section Two, the provision banning racially discriminatory voting practices.
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court found the VRA’s preclearance formula to be unconstitutional. The opinion rendered Section Five protections ineffectual, as without a formula to determine covered states, the Section’s protections cannot be applied. In 2026, the Supreme Court also struck a major blow to Section Two by requiring plaintiffs to show something closer to discriminatory intent than the previous standard, which centered on showing discriminatory results. The case, Louisiana v. Callais, requires a plaintiff to show that “evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” This differs from prior case law (Gingles), which emphasized that only a showing of discriminatory results, not intent, was required for a Section Two claim.
While Maryland’s VRA does not include language meant to fill the gap in the VRA left by Shelby County, it does counter the weakening of Section Two caused by the Callais decision. Under the Maryland Act, a county or municipality cannot use an electoral system in a way that dilutes a protected class’s voting strength. Violations require two showings: (1) that racially polarized voting exists, and (2) that the electoral system dilutes the protected class’s voting power. Unlike Callais, the Maryland law does not appear to require evidence supporting a strong inference of discriminatory intent. Rather, the success of a claimant under the act depends on the racially disparate impacts of an electoral system and thus aligns more closely with Section Two protections under Gingles, the prevailing Section Two standard prior to Callais.
While Maryland’s legislation does fill a gap in the Federal Voting Rights Act left by Callais, the act’s future is not necessarily secure. In Callais, the court held that Section Two imposes liability only when evidence supports a “strong inference” of discriminatory intent, that a state intentionally drew districts to dilute the voting power of a minority group. Maryland’s law, as referenced above, doesn’t require a showing of intent. While the Callais decision implicated Congress’s power, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment still applies to states. Thus, if Maryland enforces the Act against a state body that draws dilutive lines, that body could make an argument similar to the one in Callais under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, other states that have passed similar provisions resurrecting Section Two, as it was under Gingles, are subject to the same challenges.
Maryland has joined eleven other states in enacting a state version of the Voting Rights Act. Other states with their own acts include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington. While Maryland doesn’t preserve Section Five’s preclearance process (at the state level), some states do, including Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Washington. For a comprehensive overview of existing state VRA laws and proposed legislation, please see the National Conference of State Legislatures’ coverage here.